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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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New York Times
February 11, 2004

Bush Plans To Focus On Fuel Ban To End Spread Of A-Bombs

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 — President Bush is to announce a new proposal on Wednesday to limit the number of nations allowed to produce nuclear fuel, senior administration officials said Tuesday. He will declare that the global

network in nuclear goods set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, developer of Pakistan's bomb, exposed huge gaps in accords to stop the spread of nuclear weapons technology, they added.

In an afternoon speech at the National Defense University, they said, Mr. Bush will call for a re-examination of what one official called the "basic bargain" underlying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: that those states that promise not to pursue nuclear weapons will receive help in producing nuclear fuel for power generation.

Iran admitted last year that it had cheated on that agreement for 18 years, secretly building uranium enrichment facilities, though the country denied that it intended to produce weapons. North Korea abandoned the treaty last year and declared it was making nuclear arms.

Dr. Khan's network secretly sold equipment to both countries, and to Libya, American and Pakistani officials have said.

The administration officials said Mr. Bush would not call for a reopening of the 1970 treaty, which one said would be "too hard." Instead, he will appeal to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 40 countries that sell most nuclear technology, to refuse to sell equipment to any country that is not already equipped to make nuclear fuel, either by enriching uranium or by reprocessing spent fuel for plutonium.

But the officials did not describe any new enforcement mechanisms.

In a briefing on Tuesday evening, one administration official said Iran and North Korea were examples of "regimes which have cynically exploited loopholes in the existing treaty" to build up their capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel.

While proliferation experts have long agreed that the treaty is flawed, Mr. Bush's proposal is bound to raise protests from developing nations, which say the United States and, by extension, the other declared nuclear states — Britain, France, Russia and China — are trying to extend their rights to produce weapons while denying that status to other states.

In addition to those five, Israel, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, and North Korea is believed by American intelligence agencies to have at least two and perhaps several more.

Israel is a particularly difficult case for the United States because it has never declared its nuclear ability and has never signed the nonproliferation treaty. Its Arab neighbors and Pakistan have said that any reopening of nuclear regulation should start with forcing Israel to sign the treaty.

In the briefing, the official also said Mr. Bush would discuss for the first time the details of how Dr. Khan's network operated, being careful to praise President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and to portray Dr. Khan, the former head of Khan Research Laboratories, as a rogue scientist.

Another administration official said Mr. Bush would cast the Khan case as a victory for American intelligence operations, describing "how we uncovered the reach of the network, how we identified the key individuals, how we followed the key transactions, and how we monitored the movement of material and recorded conversation and penetrated operations."

The director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, made a similar case last week, and administration officials clearly hope the story of the intelligence surrounding the Khan network will be a counterpoint to criticisms of how Iraq's weapons program was misjudged.

Mr. Bush is also to identify B. S. A. Tahir, a Sri Lanka-born trader who moved to Dubai as a child, as the "other major node" in the Khan network.

It was Mr. Tahir, who divides his time between Kuala Lumpur and Dubai, who negotiated with a Malaysian company called Scomi to produce parts for high-speed centrifuges, which enrich uranium, Scomi officials have said. It was the interception of one such shipment to Libya in October that allowed American intelligence officials to present Pakistan with evidence about Dr. Khan.

In recent days, efforts to reach Mr. Tahir in Malaysia have been unsuccessful. He owns 49 percent of a computer company, S.M.B. Computers, in Dubai, according to Dubai government documents. Scomi officials have identified him as one of the men who negotiated the deal under which they produced the parts.

Mr. Bush's speech will mark the first time Mr. Tahir has been publicly identified by the United States as a major player, though intelligence officials have mentioned, on background, what they say was his central role in arranging the transfer of centrifuge components from Malaysia to Dubai and on to Libya.

Mr. Bush's proposals appear to be intended to crack down on states like North Korea and Iran without reopening negotiations that could limit the United States' own ability to produce nuclear fuel for weapons and power, or stop allies like Japan from producing such fuel for power plants. China says Japan's program could be diverted to weapons.

He is expected to implicitly reject, for example, an alternative proposal by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for an international organization to control the production of all nuclear fuel and how it is used.

The Bush administration has already, in effect, dismissed that approach as unworkable, in part, experts say, because it would limit Washington's ability to produce fuel for its nuclear arsenal.

Mr. Bush's insistence on moving ahead with research on a new class of so-called bunker-busting nuclear weapons has been cited by his opponents — including many in Europe — as an example of a double standard in which he seeks to stop other states from building weapons while continuing to improve the American arsenal.

The official also said in the briefing that Mr. Bush would propose expanding the Nunn-Lugar program, in which Congress appropriates funds to destroy weapons and retrain former Soviet weapons experts.

His plan would extend the program to scientists in other nations, including Iraq. But Mr. Bush will propose no new financing, and no expansion of the program is included in the budget he sent to Congress last week. Democrats say the existing program is underfinanced.

Mr. Bush will also call for an expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a loose affiliation of countries, organized by the United States, to intercept unconventional weapons. The seizure of the Libyan shipment in October was the biggest single success, though other equipment has been seized on the way to North Korea.

In the briefing, the administration official said Mr. Bush would propose several changes to the internal operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency, which has had rocky relations with the Bush administration over Iraq, did not know that Mr. Bush planned to speak on nonproliferation until informed by a reporter on Tuesday. The official said Mr. Bush would call for a new committee within the agency to monitor compliance with "safeguards" agreements, which allow inspection where nuclear fuel or weapons work may be conducted.

He will also call on the agency's board to bar from it any country under investigation. Iran was a board member throughout a confrontation last year over allowing full inspections of its facilities.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/11PREX.html>

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Stolen radioactive material may be fatal

(China Daily)

Updated: 2004-02-11 01:32

A quantity of a potentially deadly radioactive substance, cesium-137, was stolen from a construction site in Pucheng County, Shaanxi Province, at least five days ago.

Police believe whoever took it may have confused the football-sized lead container used to store the cesium-137 with discarded metal scraps.

Cesium-137 is a very active radioactive metal that explodes when brought in contact with water. It is mainly used in photoelectronic batteries, vacuum valves and as a test tool in metal surveys. It can cause blood diseases, sterility and birth defects.

Local officials have asked anyone who finds the football-shaped container not to open it, put it in a safe place and report it immediately.

Police are already actively searching for the stolen material.

As soon as receiving the lost report, some 120 police officers and 80 local officials started searching more than two square kilometres site of the theft.

Local police officers have been searching in every house in two towns and 14 villages around the construction site. They have also prohibited all salvage stations in Pucheng County from purchasing cesium-137 and asked them to report anyone trying to sell it.

"As much as 5,000 yuan (US\$602) will be given as a reward to any one who provides valuable clues to find the radioactive matter," local police said.

The theft has attracted the attention from the Shaanxi provincial government. A working group of experts with dedicated search equipment was sent to Pucheng. They have been working for five days, said Li Zhonghong, the group leader.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/11/content_304926.htm

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Washington Times

February 11, 2004

Pg. 16

N. Korea Lists Demands For A Nuclear Freeze

Says China supports proposal

By Jae-Suk Yoo, Associated Press

SEOUL — North Korea said yesterday that it has received support from China for its proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons programs in return for free oil and other economic concessions from the United States.

China signaled its support at a meeting in Beijing between North Korea's vice foreign minister, Kim Kye Gwan, and top Chinese officials including Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. The Chinese side "recognized the rationality" of Pyongyang's proposal to help end the nuclear dispute, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman told KCNA.

The United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia are scheduled to begin talks on Feb. 25 over U.S. demands that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons programs in a "complete, irreversible and verifiable manner."

North Korea has proposed to freeze all its nuclear activities as a first step to resolving the nuclear dispute if the United States provides free oil shipments, lifts economic sanctions and removes the communist country from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism.

The Bush administration insists that North Korea begin dismantling — not just freezing — its nuclear programs before it makes any concessions.

China cautioned against expecting a swift resolution of the standoff, saying all sides should have "realistic" expectations about the upcoming talks.

"The question is a very complicated one ... and we have different views about the issue," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said yesterday. She added that the sides "should not expect to solve the issue within one or two rounds of talks."

Earlier yesterday, North Korea denied receiving nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan, and accused the United States of spreading false rumors.

"This is nothing but a mean and groundless propaganda," a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman told KCNA. Meanwhile, Radio Free Asia reported yesterday that a man who leaked documents from a North Korean prison camp detailing chemical weapons and gas experiments on political prisoners — including women and children — has been arrested by Chinese authorities after escaping across the border with his family.

"We have pleaded with the American authorities, but we have been disappointed," said South Korean human rights activist Kim Sang-hun, who is conducting an international campaign to pressure Chinese authorities to free the North Korean man and his family.

"These people will be dragged to North Korea, [where] they will face death. This person will be executed, or punished," Mr. Kim said.

A State Department spokesman in Washington declined to comment, saying U.S. officials here were not aware of the arrest.

Mr. Kim did not name the man nor did he give details of the family, all of whom were arrested in China recently.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040210-115645-4341r.htm>

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Baltimore Sun

February 11, 2004

U.S. Biodefense Campus Set For Fort Detrick

3 agencies gain 'synergy,' security; critics see waste; High-security campus targets biowarfare agents

By Scott Shane, Sun Staff

Three federal agencies plan to build adjoining high-security laboratories at Fort Detrick for a total cost of more than \$1 billion, creating a "national biodefense campus" where scientists will collaborate in the battle against bioterrorism.

The plan would create three new labs in Frederick operated by the Army, the Department of Homeland Security and the National Institutes of Health - and possibly a fourth lab for the U.S. Department of Agriculture - all equipped to handle the most dangerous pathogens in existence.

Federal officials have been meeting quietly for more than a year to plan the biodefense campus, part of a national boom in bioterrorism research in the wake of the Sept. 11 aircraft hijackings and the anthrax attacks of 2001.

The federal biodefense research budget has ballooned from \$305 million in 2001 to nearly \$4 billion this year, by one official's estimate.

Some public health experts call the proliferation of high-security labs wasteful and say they steal funding from problems more serious than bioterrorism. But federal officials insist all the new labs planned for the biodefense campus are necessary.

"It's a national asset being put together in an area where there's currently a strategic shortfall," said Army Col. John E. Ball, garrison commander at Fort Detrick, who is coordinating construction of the campus.

Building multiple labs within walking distance will not create redundancy but might save money, Ball said:

"Because you can share, you can spend less on security, roads, parking, cafeteria, library and other things."

"We'll get a lot of synergy from being on the same campus," said Maureen I. McCarthy, director of research and development for the Department of Homeland Security. "The science may be similar. But we're three different agencies with different mission requirements."

The biodefense campus is an economic prize for Frederick County, bringing lucrative construction contracts and the promise of hundreds of highly paid jobs for scientists and support staff.

And, because Fort Detrick has handled dangerous germs since World War II, most neighbors are not worried about possible expansion, said Frederick Mayor Jennifer P. Dougherty, who supports the plan.

"As long as Fort Detrick continues to be as proactive as it has been in the community and with its neighbors, I don't anticipate any issues," she said.

But critics say biodefense expansion has become a boondoggle for government agencies and universities that are cashing in on fear. They note that only five people died as a result of the biggest bioterrorist attack in U.S. history, the anthrax letters.

And in that case, FBI investigators appear to believe the perpetrator was not a foreign terrorist but an American with ties to Fort Detrick or other U.S. biodefense labs.

"Influenza kills annually about 50,000 people in this country," said Milton Leitenberg, an expert on biowarfare at the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies. "But we don't put our money into that."

"We sink it into bioterrorism. We're putting billions of dollars into a putative threat of disputed relevance at a time when there's a shortage of flu vaccine and measles vaccine."

Dr. David M. Ozonoff, a professor of environmental health at Boston University, also questioned government priorities.

"Bioterrorism is hollowing out public health from within," said Ozonoff. "It's much more likely that bird flu will kill millions of people than anthrax," he added, referring to the possibility that an avian flu strain in Asia could spread among humans.

Rutgers University biochemist Richard H. Ebright said consolidating high-security research at Fort Detrick makes some sense.

But he noted that other federally funded Biosafety Level 4 labs are approved for Boston University, the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and the Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Hamilton, Mont. On top of those, he said, the Detrick campus would create "an enormous overcapacity."

"If they proceed with this plan at Detrick, they should cancel Hamilton, Boston and Galveston," Ebright said.

The plan for the National Interagency Biodefense Campus illustrates vividly how the terror attacks of 2001 have transformed funding for biodefense.

Before 2001, the Army's biodefense research center, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, had little competition in research on exotic diseases that might be used as weapons. Nor was there much interest - post-Cold War budget cuts in the mid-1990s forced the Army to reduce the institute's staffing by 25 percent.

But things began to pick up in 1998, after former President Bill Clinton read *The Cobra Event*, a thriller by Richard Preston about a fictional bioattack, and became convinced that the threat was real.

That was the year that Dr. Donald A. Henderson, leader of the worldwide campaign to eradicate smallpox, opened the first university biodefense think tank at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health.

But only after the 2001 attacks did the funding spigots open. Dozens of universities have rushed to create bioterrorism research centers to compete for the new money. A variety of federal agencies have also taken a new interest in germs.

The Detrick campus plan, as described by federal officials, will include:

Army: A replacement for the aging Army biodefense unit at Fort Detrick, known as USAMRIID, estimated to cost \$850 million to \$1 billion. A congressional report has acknowledged that a new facility is needed, but the project has not yet been funded. USAMRIID's mission is to study diseases that threaten U.S. troops, including those resulting from deliberate attack.

National Institutes of Health: The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease will break ground this year on a \$105 million Integrated Research Facility, where animals will be used to study the exotic diseases likely to be used for biological attack.

Dr. Mary E. Wright, chief of the clinical biodefense research branch at NIAID, said the lab will take "a medical approach," using animals to develop standards for diagnosis and treatment. "There was no research on these microorganisms for many, many years," Wright said.

Department of Homeland Security: The \$120 million National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center will work chiefly on "threat characterization" - understanding what organisms, in natural or bioengineered form, pose a terrorist threat.

In addition, a bioforensics unit will study how scientists can use genetic or chemical analysis to trace germs to their source, as FBI scientists are trying to do with the mailed anthrax of 2001. The new lab will create databases and other computer tools to be consulted in case of an attack.

Department of Agriculture: USDA and the Department of Defense are studying a possible lab to research zoonotic diseases, which pass from animals to humans. Although Fort Detrick officials have assigned space on the campus, no final decision on construction has been made, said Caird Rexroad, acting associate administrator of the Agricultural Research Service.

National Cancer Institute: NCI's existing facility at Fort Detrick would be considered part of the campus, sharing its expertise on cancer and HIV with researchers working directly on bioterrorism, said Col. Ball.

Gateway Center: A separate building housing a library, cafeteria, security offices and other shared facilities. The cost has not been estimated, Ball said.

<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/bal-te.biodefense11feb11,1,2529723.story>

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Washington Post

February 12, 2004

Pg. 1

Bush Details Plan To Curb Nuclear Arms

By Dana Milbank and Peter Slevin, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush yesterday called for a tightening of international rules governing the spread of nuclear technology, a proposal that would be the most significant change to nonproliferation efforts in more than three decades.

Bush, in a speech at the National Defense University, proposed revoking the long-standing bargain in the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty that allows countries to develop peaceful atomic energy in return for a verifiable pledge not to build nuclear weapons. Calling that agreement a "loophole" exploited by North Korea and Iran, Bush instead proposed that nuclear fuel be provided only to countries that renounce nuclear enrichment and reprocessing.

"This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs," Bush said. "Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons."

The president also proposed an expansion, to countries such as Iraq and Libya, of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, which finds alternative employment for former Soviet scientists, while weapons programs are dismantled. "The nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials," he said.

The speech marked an opportunity for Bush to demonstrate his credentials on nuclear proliferation in response to criticism that he has mismanaged the rising problem. In his remarks, Bush sought to capitalize on recent successes -- such as persuading Libya to renounce its weapons program and cracking a nuclear smuggling operation in Pakistan -- as catalysts for mobilizing a new international effort.

Some diplomats welcome Bush's engagement and some of his ideas but voiced skepticism that all the ideas would be embraced, in part because nonnuclear nations have little to gain by cooperating with the tightened restrictions. Arms-control experts also said Bush's proposal will face a hostile reception internationally because it seeks to crack down on rogue nations while requiring little of U.S. allies.

Bush is also likely to face resistance at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog organization, with which the administration feuded over Iraq. Bush made his proposals without consulting IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei, who was briefed by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell just a few hours before the speech.

Democrats said they supported Bush's ideas but were doubtful of his willingness to achieve them. "Nothing the president proposed today will be successful unless the administration reverses course and undertakes serious and sustained cooperation in law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and diplomacy to halt nuclear proliferation," said Sen. John F. Kerry (Mass.), the leading Democratic candidate for president. "Despite today's rhetoric, the Bush administration continues to underfund our Nunn-Lugar efforts [and] has stood on the sidelines while North Korea developed an advanced nuclear capacity."

In his speech, Bush said the international community must aggressively pursue black-market producers and distributors who operate beyond the margins of nonbinding agreements drafted years ago by industrialized countries. The United States and 10 other countries that participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which tracks illicit

cargo, must expand their operations to include law enforcement tactics more nimble than the long-standing international arrangements, he said.

"We will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers," Bush said in language reminiscent of his anti-terrorism speeches after Sept. 11, 2001. "We will find you and we are not going to rest until you are stopped."

Both Bush and ElBaradei have concluded that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be too complicated to renegotiate. The treaty granted an "inalienable right" to atomic energy for peaceful purposes and permitted the five existing members of the atomic weapons club to keep their arsenals.

Three countries -- India, Pakistan and Israel -- refused to sign the treaty and developed nuclear weapons. North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty in 2002 after violating its terms, is believed by U.S. intelligence to have at least one atomic device. Iran signed the treaty, but U.S. officials believe it has started a secret weapons program -- though Iran denies it.

Bush's plan is designed to prevent countries from hiding nuclear weapons programs behind ostensibly peaceable energy projects, as he accused North Korea and Iran of doing.

Under Bush's plan, any government that cannot now enrich or reprocess uranium must not be allowed to acquire the equipment and expertise to do so. Nonnuclear countries that have atomic energy needs will be provided with nuclear fuel at reasonable prices. Current nuclear countries would be permitted to keep control over their own fuel cycles.

Bush said that the IAEA needs a separate committee to manage security and verification of stricter new rules and that any country under IAEA investigation should be on neither the committee nor the 35-member governing board. He gave the example of Iran, which recently completed a two-year term on the board.

Diplomats in Vienna, where the IAEA is based, said many of Bush's proposals would be difficult to implement. ElBaradei has emphasized the need for the countries with nuclear weapons or the ability to enrich and reprocess uranium to take steps of their own, including toward disarmament. A Vienna diplomat said, "I can envision a response from the nonnuclear states: What have you done for us in the last 34 years in terms of nuclear disarmament?"

Similarly, Ashton B. Carter, a nonproliferation specialist in the Clinton administration, applauded Bush's proposal but said it would require intensive international diplomacy. "The most important things, as with terrorism, require the assistance and shared effort of other countries," Carter said.

Bush trumpeted the undercover investigation of Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who confessed last week to selling nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea. He said U.S. and British officers trailed Khan and his associates, monitored their telephone calls and infiltrated their organization, described by U.S. officials as providing "one-stop shopping" for nuclear materials.

Intelligence operatives watched in Dubai as thousands of centrifuge parts manufactured in Malaysia were loaded aboard a ship identified as the BBC China, which was later intercepted by German and Italian authorities as it made its way toward Libya. Without naming names, Bush said that "other countries expressed great interest in their services."

There has been speculation that the Pakistani military may have supported Khan or known of his lucrative activities. Bush said Khan, widely known as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, sold uranium hexafluoride gas and nuclear blueprints stolen from the Pakistani government.

Bush said Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, an important ally in the U.S. effort against the al Qaeda terror network, has pledged to disclose all results of Pakistan's investigation into Khan and "assures us his country will never again be a source of proliferation."

Peter Slevin reported from Vienna.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34725-2004Feb11.html>

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New York Times

February 12, 2004

Pg. 1

A Tale Of Nuclear Proliferation

How Pakistani Built His Network

By William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Raymond Bonner

The break for American intelligence operatives tracking Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear network came in the wet August heat in Malaysia, as five giant cargo containers full of specialized centrifuge parts were loaded into one of the nondescript vessels that ply the Straits of Malacca.

The C.I.A. had penetrated the factory of Scomi Precision Engineering, where one of the nuclear network's operatives — known to the workers only as Tinner — watched over the production of the delicate machinery needed to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs.

Spy satellites tracked the shipment as it wended its way to Dubai, where it was relabeled "used machinery" and transferred to a German-owned ship, the BBC China. When it headed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, the order went out from Washington to have it seized, according to accounts from American officials.

That seizure led to the unraveling of a trading network that sent bomb-making designs and equipment to at least three countries — Iran, North Korea and Libya — and has laid bare the limits of international controls on nuclear proliferation.

Yesterday, President Bush proposed to enhance that system by restricting the production of nuclear fuel to a few nations.

The scope and audacity of the illicit network are still not fully known. Nor is it known whether the Pakistani military or government, which had supported Dr. Khan's research, were complicit in his activities.

But what has become clear in recent days is that Dr. Khan, a Pakistani national hero who began his rise 30 years ago by importing nuclear equipment to secretly build his country's atom bomb, gradually transformed himself into the largest and most sophisticated exporter in the nuclear black market.

"It was an astounding transformation when you think about it, something we've never seen before," said a senior American official who has reviewed the intelligence. "First, he exploits a fragmented market and develops a quite advanced nuclear arsenal. Then he throws the switch, reverses the flow and figures out how to sell the whole kit, right down to the bomb designs, to some of the world's worst governments."

The story of that transformation emerges from recent interviews on three continents — from Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; from the streets of Dubai, where many of the deals were cut, to Washington and Vienna, where intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency struggled to understand and defuse the threat.

Taken together, they show how Dr. Khan assembled a far-reaching organization of scientists, engineers and business executives who operated on murky boundaries between the legal and the illegal, sometimes underground but often in plain view, unencumbered by international agreements that prohibit trafficking in nuclear technology.

Dr. Khan started in the mid-1980's, according to nuclear proliferation experts, by ordering twice the number of parts the Pakistani nuclear program needed, and then selling the excess to other countries, notably Iran.

Later, his network acquired another customer: North Korea, which was desperate for a more surreptitious way to build nuclear weapons after the United States had frozen the North's huge plutonium-production facilities in Yongbyon.

And in the end he moved on to Libya, his ultimate undoing, selling entire kits, from centrifuges to enrich uranium, to crude weapons designs. Investigators found the weapons blueprints wrapped in bags from an Islamabad dry cleaner.

In his speech yesterday, Mr. Bush said the network even sold raw uranium to be processed into bomb fuel. He also identified Dr. Khan's deputy — "the network's chief financial officer and money-launderer," he called him — as Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, a businessman in Dubai, who, investigators say, placed the order for the Libyan equipment.

One longtime trading partner of Dr. Khan's was Peter Griffin, a British engineer who said in an interview that he had been a supplier to Pakistan for two decades, in the period when Dr. Khan was building nuclear weapons.

"Anything that could be sent to Pakistan, I sent to Pakistan," he said. But he said that all his sales had been approved by British trade authorities.

Mr. Griffin is also the partner in a Dubai company that investigators said placed the order for materials that wound up on the ship headed for Libya, although he denies knowing anything about that shipment.

For years hints of Dr. Khan's operation circulated widely among intelligence officers and officials in Pakistan, the United States and elsewhere. But Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, confronted Dr. Khan only after the BBC China was seized on its way to Libya and evidence of the network tumbled out. Last week Dr. Khan issued a public confession and then was pardoned by General Musharraf.

The deference shown Dr. Khan at the end began decades before, when he was working secretly and successfully to make his country a nuclear power.

"Khan had a complete blank check," said one aide close to General Musharraf. "He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price."

Research Roots in Holland

Dr. Khan's start came with India's first atomic test in 1974, an event that so traumatized Pakistan that developing its own weapon became the country's most pressing goal. "We will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own," said Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the prime minister.

Dr. Khan, a bright young Pakistani metallurgist working in the Netherlands, lent his aid. From his perch at Urenco, a European consortium, he possessed blueprints of the world's best centrifuges — the hollow metal tubes that spin very fast to enrich natural uranium into bomb fuel.

A set of thousands of centrifuges, called a cascade, concentrates the rare U-235 isotope to make a potent fuel.

"I saw top-secret technical drawings in his house," recalled Frits Veerman, a Dutch colleague who shared an office with Dr. Khan.

Dr. Khan stole the designs, Dutch investigators found, and he fled back to Pakistan in 1976. He used the blueprints and his knowledge to set up an enrichment project in Kahuta, near Islamabad, that reported directly to the prime minister. He drew heavily on Dutch lists of nearly 100 companies that supplied centrifuge parts and materials.

"They literally begged us to buy their equipment," Dr. Khan boasted in 2001 in a publication celebrating the 25th anniversary of his Pakistani laboratory. "My long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset."

Business executives and merchants, including German, Dutch and French middlemen, flocked to Pakistan to offer price lists for high-technology goods and learn what Pakistan needed. The multilingual Dr. Khan led the acquisition effort. His shopping spree spanned the world.

"Africa was important because of the materials needed," said a senior Pakistani official involved in the investigation of Dr. Khan. "Europe was crucial for bringing in high-tech machines and components. Dubai was the place for shipments and for payments."

"We were not the first beneficiaries of this network. But the intensity of Pakistan's nuclear acquisition effort did enlarge the market. Everybody knew that there is a buyer out there, loaded with money and hellbent on getting this ultimate weapon."

Even in the early days, the trade was no secret. Washington sent Germany dozens of complaints about their leaky export-control system that let "dual use" technology leave even though some was clearly intended for Pakistan's nuclear program, said Mark Hibbs, a Germany-based editor of a technical journal, *Nucleonics Week*. But many of those warnings were ignored, he said.

Mr. Veerman said Dutch companies continued to work with Dr. Khan after it was clear he was developing centrifuges for a weapon. Dr. Khan even sent scientists to the Netherlands in the late 1970's for centrifuge-related training.

Eventually the flow of technology reversed, two senior Pakistani military officials involved in the probe of Dr. Khan said. "These contacts and channels were later used for sending technology out of Pakistan by certain individuals," a military official said, "including Dr. A. Q. Khan."

From Buyer to Seller

Dr. Khan had three motives, investigators say. He was eager to defy the West and pierce "clouds of the so-called secrecy," as he once put it. He was equally eager to transfer technology to other Muslim nations, according to a senior Pakistani politician. "He also said that giving technology to a Muslim country was not a crime," the politician said.

But another motive appears to have been money. As Dr. Khan's nuclear successes grew, so did his wealth. He acquired homes and properties, including a tourist hotel in Africa.

A family friend said Dr. Khan spoke of the centrifuge designs he perfected as if the technology belonged to him personally, not to Pakistan. A senior politician said that in meetings with Chaudry Shujat Hussain, leader of a pro-Musharraf political party, Dr. Khan never spoke of selling the technology, only of "sharing" it.

He started slowly. He simply ordered more parts in the black market than he needed for Pakistan.

At first, Western intelligence agencies tracking Dr. Khan were perplexed.

"In the 1980's, I remember being told by officials that Khan was over-ordering centrifuge parts and they couldn't understand why," recalled Simon Henderson, a London-based author who has written extensively about Dr. Khan. It eventually became clear that the extras went to clients outside Pakistan.

Around 1987, Dr. Khan struck a deal with Iran, which wanted to build 50,000 centrifuges of a type known as P-1, for Pakistan-1, an entry-level model, Western investigators found. If ever completed, a plant that size would let Tehran make fuel for about 30 atom bombs each year.

As Pakistan's own technology became more sophisticated, Dr. Khan sold old Pakistani centrifuges and parts, Western investigators found, some contaminated with highly enriched uranium.

Iran appears to have acquired such second-hand gear. "They were not happy to discover they overpaid for old wares," said one American intelligence official. But for Iran, it was a start.

A Pakistani military official involved in the investigation of Dr. Khan said foreign requests for technology "came on paper, in person, through third parties, in meetings with Khan himself."

The scientist then used the vast logistic system available to him, which included government cargo planes, to ship the components to middlemen, who cloaked the source.

"The same network, the same routes, the same people who brought the technology in were also sending it out," said the military official.

In the final stages of his export career, Dr. Khan simply used his middlemen to order large shipments of parts for foreigners, even if Pakistan had no apparent role in the transaction and appeared to receive no direct benefits, American investigators said.

A Made-to-Order Customer

When Libya embarked on a two-step effort to become a nuclear-weapons nation, Dr. Khan's network was presented with an opportunity to sell a particularly sophisticated system. The network was moving to a new level of ambition. Libya's initial focus was the aging P-1 design, American and European investigators said. But eventually the Libyans sought a more efficient technology, the P-2, made of maraging steel, a superhard alloy. That design has steel rotors that could spin nearly twice as fast as earlier aluminum ones, doubling the rate of enrichment.

The central figure in the Libyan P-2 effort, American officials said, was Mr. Tahir, a Sri Lankan native who had moved to Dubai as a child. Dr. Khan had attended Mr. Tahir's wedding in 1998, Malaysian officials said.

In his speech yesterday, Mr. Bush said Mr. Tahir used a company in Dubai, SMB Computers, "as a front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network." Corporate records list him as an owner.

Another associate whose name surfaced in the Libyan deal was Mr. Griffin, the British engineer who long procured gear for Dr. Khan, according to investigators in several countries, corporate records and company officials.

Interviewed by telephone from France, Mr. Griffin, 68, declined to discuss details of his early relationship with Dr. Khan but said he had known him for decades. "We met ages ago," he said.

Mr. Griffin said that all the items he sent to Pakistan were approved by the British Department of Trade and Industry and that he had done nothing illegal. He said the British authorities had seized his computer in June from his home in France. That had given rise to false "suspicions that Gulf Technical Industries and myself were doing things for Libya," Mr. Griffin said. "There's no such truth in it."

In June 2000, according to investigators and public records, Mr. Griffin set up a trading company in Dubai, Gulf Technical Industries. The following year, it contracted with a Malaysian manufacturing conglomerate to make sophisticated parts.

The manufacturer, Scomi Group Berhad, said it signed a contract with Gulf Technical in December 2001 to supply the components. Mr. Griffin and Mr. Tahir had met with company officials months earlier, in February 2001, to discuss the possible deal, said Rohaida Ali Badaruddin, a Scomi spokeswoman. After the contract was signed, Scomi set up Scomi Precision Engineering, hired some 40 workers, bought costly machine tools and began work, she said.

Dr. Khan provided the blueprints for the machines and parts, said a close aide to General Musharraf who is familiar with the Pakistani investigation. "He had given most of the designs," the aide said. At one point Dr. Khan suggested that two of his senior aides join the Malaysian enterprise, the aide said.

Scomi Precision made its first shipment to Gulf Technical in December 2002 and the last in August 2003.

Investigators said the shipments were largely P-2 centrifuge parts.

Throughout the work at Scomi Precision, the man known as Tinner, an engineer sent from Dubai by Mr. Tahir, was on site overseeing the work, a Scomi official said.

In a statement, Scomi said the shipments had consisted only of "14 semifinished components." Company officials said they never knew of the intended use of the parts.

A senior Bush administration official disputed the company's account, saying it would be highly unlikely that someone there did not know what they were producing. American and European weapons experts also said that the shipment headed for Libya contained thousands of centrifuge parts.

"Their goal was far reaching," a top European nuclear expert said of the Libyans. "They had ordered this very large amount."

Mr. Griffin acknowledged that he had been to Malaysia and that he and Mr. Tahir had met with Scomi officials. But he said the discussion had to do with exports of tank trucks, a deal he said never materialized. Mr. Griffin said that if Mr. Tahir had continued to meet with Scomi officials, or struck any deals, he had not authorized it.

But a Scomi official insisted the meeting was to discuss Scomi's contract for finely tooled parts.

Malaysian officials said Mr. Tahir was under investigation in Malaysia, but was not under arrest. His younger brother, Sayed Ibrahim Bukhari, said in a telephone interview this week that Mr. Tahir does not hold any ownership position in SMB Computers.

Mr. Bush said the Malaysian authorities had assured Washington that the Scomi factory was no longer producing centrifuge parts.

An American expert said the Libyans planned on making at least 10,000 of the machines. Such a complex would make enough highly enriched uranium each year for about 10 nuclear weapons.

But the advanced centrifuges never reached Libya. They were seized on the BBC China.

When investigators went to Libya, they found that Dr. Khan's network had also provided blueprints for a nuclear weapon. For investigators, it was a startling revelation of how audacious and dangerous the black market had become. And it made them recognize that they did not know who else out there was buying and selling. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, "We haven't really seen the full picture."

Reporting for this article was contributed by David Rohde and Talat Hussain from Pakistan, Craig S. Smith from the Netherlands and Tim Golden from New York.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/international/asia/12NUKE.html>

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Washington Post

Undeclared Centrifuge Design Found in Iran

By GEORGE JAHN

The Associated Press

Thursday, February 12, 2004; 10:11 AM

VIENNA, Austria - In another apparent link to the nuclear black market emanating from Pakistan, U.N. inspectors in Iran have discovered undeclared designs of an advanced centrifuge used to enrich uranium, diplomats said Thursday.

The diplomats said preliminary investigations suggested the design matched drawings of enrichment equipment found in Libya and supplied through the network headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

The revelations came a day after President Bush acknowledged loopholes in the international enforcement system and urged the United Nations and member states to draw up laws that spell out criminal penalties for nuclear trafficking.

While publicly accusing Khan of being the mastermind of the clandestine nuclear supply operation, Bush avoided criticism of the Pakistani government, a key ally in the fight against terror. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf says his government knew nothing of Khan's network, even though the military controlled the nation's nuclear program.

Khan apparently relied on European businessmen already investigated - and in some cases convicted - for selling similar equipment to Pakistan in the 1980s, U.S. officials said. The present network allegedly evolved from Khan's black-market deals starting in the 1970s. Pakistan publicly declared itself a nuclear power in 1998.

Chief U.N. nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei, in comments published Thursday, said he shared Bush's concerns over the nuclear black market and urged the United States and other nuclear powers to do more to stop the spread of nuclear arms.

Khan, a national hero in Pakistan for creating a nuclear deterrent against archrival India, confessed on Pakistani television last week to masterminding a network that supplied Libya, Iran and North Korea with nuclear technology. Musharraf then pardoned him.

In a speech Thursday, Musharraf said help with nuclear proliferation had come from different countries - not just Pakistan - but conceded that Pakistan also shared blame.

"Everything did not happen from Pakistan. Everything happened from many other countries. But things happened from here also, and we need to correct our house," he said. "We are a responsible nation. We must not proliferate." Beyond adding a link to the chain of equipment, middlemen and companies comprising the clandestine nuclear network, the find by U.N. nuclear inspectors reported Thursday cast doubt on Iran's willingness to open its nuclear activities to international perusal.

Accused of having nuclear weapons ambitions, Iran - which denies the charge - agreed late last year to throw open its programs to pervasive inspections by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency and said it would freely provide information to clear up international suspicions.

But the diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Iran did not volunteer the designs. Instead, they said, IAEA inspectors had to dig for them.

"Coming up with them is an example of real good inspector work," one of the diplomats told The Associated Press.

"They took information and put it together and put something in front of them that they can't deny."

At less-enriched levels, uranium is normally used to generate power. Highly enriched, it can be used for nuclear warheads.

Iran, which says it sought to make low-enriched uranium, has bowed to international pressure and suspended all enrichment. But it continues to make and assemble centrifuges, a development that critics say also throws into question its commitment to dispel suspicions about its nuclear aims.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher warned last month that failure by Iran to indefinitely suspend "all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities would be deeply troubling."

The IAEA continues to negotiate with Iran on what constitutes suspension, but ElBaradei, its director general, also is known to be seeking a commitment from Iran to stop assembling centrifuges.

The diplomats said Iran had not yet formally explained why the advanced centrifuge designs were not voluntarily handed over to the agency as part of its pledge to disclose all past and present activities that could be linked to weapons.

Also Thursday, Malaysia's leader questioned U.S. intelligence on his country's role in nuclear deals said B.S.A.

Tahir, the man Bush called its "chief financial officer and money launderer," would not be arrested, for now.

"There is no such thing as Malaysia's involvement," Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said.

Bush said Khan and his associates used a company in Malaysia to manufacture parts for centrifuges and that front companies had been used to "deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials." The company doesn't dispute it made the parts, but says it didn't know what they were for.

Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, operated a computer company and ordered centrifuge components from the Malaysian precision engineering factory using designs from Pakistan, Bush said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35996-2004Feb12.html>

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New York Times

February 12, 2004

Saving Ourselves From Self-Destruction

By Mohamed ElBaradei

VIENNA--Nuclear proliferation is on the rise. Equipment, material and training were once largely inaccessible.

Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive themselves to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability — and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programs. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons.

If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction.

Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st-century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the nonproliferation regime.

The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, a priority President Bush identified yesterday in his speech on nuclear nonproliferation. The current system relies on a gentlemen's agreement that is not only nonbinding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise.

We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls — while preserving the rights of all states to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.

In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended — and rightly so — in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of nonproliferation treaty obligations requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 percent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. Again, as President Bush suggested yesterday, it should be in force for all countries.

In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months' notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.

This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council.

The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste — would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control.

Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users.

Toward this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.

Of course, a fundamental part of the nonproliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear states recognized under the nonproliferation treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the nonproliferation treaty review conference next year.

We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of longstanding conflict like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.

Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place.

Mohamed ElBaradei is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/opinion/12ELBA.html>

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Los Angeles Times

February 12, 2004

CIA Website Seeks Data On Iraq Weapons

By Reuters

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency, under fire over its intelligence about Iraq's arms programs, has posted a notice on its website offering rewards to Iraqis for information about such weapons.

The Iraqi Rewards Program notice at <http://www.cia.gov> seeks "specific and verifiable information" on stocks of "recently made" chemical or biological weapons, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and components.

U.S. intelligence agencies have been criticized for their estimates of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction because none have been found since the U.S.-led invasion last March.

The unspecified rewards were also offered for providing the location of chemical or biological laboratories and factories; development, production and test sites; and places where such materials were "secretly disposed."

Visitors to the site can respond on electronic forms in English and Arabic. The CIA said the forms were secure and would protect the information and the identity of the sender.

The agency's site gets many visitors from all over the world, a spokesman said. "It's just trying to get the word as broadly publicized as possible."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-cia12feb12.1.4898201.story>

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London Daily Telegraph

February 12, 2004

Chinese Agents Seize N Korean Defector

By Robin Gedye

China has hunted down and arrested a North Korean defector who revealed the first documentary evidence of Pyongyang's chemical and biological experiments on political prisoners, said his supporters yesterday.

Kang Byong-sop, 59, was seized on the Chinese-Laotian border with his wife and youngest son, aged 25, last month after escaping from North Korea with proof that the Stalinist regime is killing political prisoners by experimenting on them with biological and chemical weapons.

Mr Kang's eldest son, Seong-kuk, who defected several years ago and acted as an intermediary in smuggling the evidence out of China shortly before his father's arrest, escaped a kidnap attempt by suspected North Korean agents in Bangkok two weeks ago.

Refugee agencies believe that North Korea, knowing Mr Kang was on the run with incriminating documents, launched a frantic hunt for him with China's help.

"The family were carrying between \$6,000 [£3,500] and \$8,000 to help in their escape when they were arrested at the border with Laos," said Kim Sang-hun, a South Korean human rights activist who organised the family's escape.

"For about 10 days we could not discover what had happened to them and were afraid they had been killed and robbed by border guards.

"Then we heard they had been jailed in the border town of Jing Hong. That was three weeks ago. We have no idea where they are now or even if they are still alive."

Mr Kim said that on the day the family was captured the head of the regional border guards came from his headquarters in Jing Hong, 100 miles away, to the tiny frontier post where they were caught.

Mr Kim believes it was no coincidence that the senior border official was present. He is convinced that the Chinese authorities, alerted to the potential value of their prey, had been offered "a considerable financial inducement" to find Mr Kang.

"Mr Kang is easy to identify," Mr Kim said. "He has to walk bent almost double after interrogation in North Korea. On one occasion his back was broken and on another he was dropped on his head, snapping his neck."

But the secret documents had already been smuggled out by Seong-kuk after Mr Kang, an engineer, took them from the February 8 Vinalon Factory, one of North Korea's largest chemical plants.

The documents, seen by The Telegraph, are headed "Letter of Transfer", marked "Top Secret" and dated February 2002 with an official stamp and signature.

Bearing the name of a victim, his date and place of his birth, the documents read: "The above person is transferred from Camp 22 for the purpose of human experimentation with liquid gas for chemical weapons."

The North Korean authorities routinely round up and imprison the relations and even friends of anyone they consider a political threat, and two weeks ago Seong-kuk stepped into a narrow alley behind the Ratchada Hotel, Bangkok, on his way to a dinner appointment, when two men with North Korean accents grabbed his arms.

"You are Kang Seong-kuk? You must come with us," they snapped. After a violent struggle he escaped with injuries to his face and arm.

Mr Kim, 70, who defected from North Korea at 14 and now lives in South Korea, says many of the refugees he has debriefed have spoken of mass experimentation on political prisoners as if it were common knowledge.

He found it almost impossible to believe until he was handed the Vinalon factory documents.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2004%2F02%2F12%2Fwkor12.xml>

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USA Today

February 13, 2004

Pg. 1

Arms Hunt In Doubt In '02

Prewar study predicted search could be fruitless

By John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — A classified U.S. intelligence study done three months before the war in Iraq predicted a problem now confronting the Bush administration: the possibility that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction might never be found.

The study by a team of U.S. intelligence analysts, military officers and civilian Pentagon officials warned that U.S. military tactics, guerrilla warfare, looting and lying by Iraqi officials would undermine the search for banned Iraqi weapons. Portions of the study were made available to USA TODAY. Three high-ranking U.S. intelligence officials described its purpose and conclusions.

"Locating a program that ... has been driven by denial and deception imperatives is no small task," the December 2002 report said. "Prolonged insecurity with factional violence and guerrilla forces still at large would be the worst outcome for finding Saddam's WMD arsenal."

The report went to the National Security Council but was not specifically shown to President Bush, the officials said.

The study findings diverge from statements by U.S. officials that caches of banned weapons would be found. In February 2003, two months after completion of the study, CIA Director George Tenet told lawmakers, "I think we will find caches of weapons of mass destruction, absolutely." Tenet was aware of the internal study, said a CIA official who advises him. But Tenet, who declined to comment, viewed its warnings as just one possible scenario among many.

Tenet's view has changed. "Finding things in Iraq is always very tough," he said last week at Georgetown University.

The study, which is still classified, and comments by David Kay, the former chief of the U.S. arms search in Iraq, call into question the president's remark Sunday on NBC's *Meet the Press* that "we'll find out" what happened to Iraq's weapons. Kay told lawmakers last month, "There will always be unresolved ambiguity" about the fate of the Iraqi arsenal.

Kay said he now believes that Iraq did not have banned weapons before the war and had probably destroyed them more than a decade ago.

The study looked at scenarios including Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons and the possibility that no weapons would be found. The study considered but rejected the possibility that Iraq had no banned weapons. The study said arms searchers would be "trying to find multiple needles in a haystack ... against the background of not knowing how many needles have been hidden."

Some of the obstacles outlined by the study included the expected rapid movement of U.S. ground forces over wide areas, leaving critical sites vulnerable to looting. Guerrilla warfare, the report predicted, also would make the weapons search difficult.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-02-12-wmd-hunt_x.htm

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Washington Post

February 13, 2004

Pg. 1

Iranian Nuclear Plans Found

Discovery Contradicts Pledge of Transparency

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

U.N. inspectors have discovered blueprints for a previously unknown Iranian program to enrich uranium, a finding that they said calls into question Iran's promise three months ago to fully disclose its nuclear activities, diplomatic sources familiar with the investigation said yesterday.

The documents -- designs for a highly sophisticated machine used in uranium enrichment -- were not declared by Iran in October when it suspended enrichment and promised full transparency for its nuclear program in the face of threatened international sanctions, the sources said. Iran acknowledged the documents only when confronted with what one official described as "unassailable" evidence by investigators of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

The blueprints contain instructions for building a type of gas centrifuge known as the P2, a super-efficient machine used in producing enriched uranium, the fuel used in nuclear power plants and a key ingredient in atomic bombs. Iran has acknowledged possessing hundreds of less efficient P1 machines at a formerly secret nuclear facility near the central town of Natanz.

Although some U.S. officials suspect Iran of operating secret enrichment facilities elsewhere in the country, IAEA investigators have found no evidence that Iran currently is using the advanced machines to enrich uranium. Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear program is intended only for energy production.

"This is not an indication of a significant new capability, but it is something that will cause people to question Iran's good faith," said one Europe-based diplomat, who, like the others, spoke on the condition that he not be identified by name. "Iran, on the other hand, will contend that their failure to declare was just an oversight."

The finding appeared to set the stage for a new confrontation between Iran and the United States and its European allies. The Bush administration, which has long accused Iran of seeking nuclear weapons, has been pushing for international sanctions against the Islamic republic. Member nations of the IAEA's board of governors could consider referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions at a meeting next month.

"There is no doubt in our mind that Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program," said Deputy of Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, reacting to the discovery of the documents in an interview yesterday with radio broadcasters. "They have not been fully forthcoming."

News of the IAEA's finding came within 24 hours of President Bush's announcement of an initiative aimed at tightening international laws governing the spread of nuclear technology. Bush cited both Iran and North Korea as

having exploited a "loophole" in the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Bush said the treaty flaw allows aspiring nuclear states to "acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons." The discovery of the blueprints was an unexpected result of the larger investigation into a nuclear trading network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the metallurgist credited with creating Pakistan's nuclear weapon. IAEA officials since November have been investigating a web of businesses and middlemen who worked with Khan in supplying nuclear technology and parts to others. Khan's known clients included both Libya and Iran. The United States carried out a parallel investigation of the network and last year presented the details to Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

After determining that Libya had received designs for the P2 machine, the investigators learned that the same suppliers had also provided the designs to Iran, according to diplomats familiar with the investigation. IAEA officials at the agency's Vienna headquarters would not comment on the finding.

In Rome, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi denied Tehran had any nuclear weapons ambitions, the Associated Press reported. "We do not have anything to hide and we are ready to be inspected more [seriously] by IAEA inspectors," Kharrazi was quoted as telling reporters on the sidelines of a conference celebrating 50 years of Vatican-Iran relations.

"There may be questions by IAEA inspectors, but we are ready to verify those, and what has been achieved altogether up until now is out of our cooperation with IAEA," Kharrazi said in English when asked about the drawings. "As long as we are ready to continue our cooperation, all outstanding questions will be verified."

The IAEA's year-long investigation of Iran's nuclear program had already documented numerous violations of Tehran's nuclear safeguards agreements, including the import of uranium from China in the early 1990s and the undeclared production of enriched uranium and plutonium. Those discoveries helped pressure Iran into signing the Oct. 31 agreement -- brokered by France, Britain and Germany -- to suspend uranium enrichment and open its nuclear facilities to more intrusive international inspections.

Since then, Iran has appeared to waffle on its pledges, and last month the Tehran government acknowledged that it was continuing to assemble additional centrifuges.

Before yesterday's disclosure, Bush administration officials had begun to signal a tougher line against Iran, hinting of new intelligence findings that strongly suggested that Iran was harboring nuclear secrets. "Some of these things the IAEA does not yet know," said one administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Former U.S. government officials and nonproliferation experts viewed the discovery of the centrifuge designs as a serious development that could result in diplomatic action against Iran. Some said they expect that nuclear weapons designs may also be found in Iran, citing recent discoveries of bomb blueprints in Libya.

"It seems the Iranians have not been telling the whole story," said Rose Gottemoeller, a top nonproliferation official at the Energy Department during the Clinton administration. "We've seen all along that they dribbled out information only when confronted, and that they reluctantly acquiesced to certain steps. It is clear at this point that the Iranians must be told to step up to the bar, because this situation is extremely dangerous."

George Perkovich, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the disclosure could be beneficial if it increases pressure on Iran to disclose and renounce nuclear activities that could be used in a weapons program.

"It's bad news, but in a way it helps because it gives us leverage," said Perkovich, the endowment's vice president for studies. "Now we can go the Iranians and say, 'Why should we trust you?' "

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37806-2004Feb12.html>

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Washington Times

February 13, 2004

Pg. 15

ElBaradei Echoes Bush On Nuke Curbs

Also urges U.S. to give up arms

From combined dispatches

VIENNA, Austria — The head of the United Nations nuclear agency as well as China and India yesterday supported President Bush's call to tighten controls on nuclear materials and stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

"I have the same concern and sense of urgency expressed by President Bush to shore up the nonproliferation regime and global security system," Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said in a brief statement released by his headquarters in Vienna.

Mr. Bush argued in a speech Wednesday that international efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction have been neither broad nor effective enough and require tougher action from all nations.

"The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons," Mr. Bush said.

His remarks came after reports surfaced of a black market apparently organized by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who once led the nuclear program in Pakistan.

Mr. Bush singled out the IAEA for criticism, calling for the creation of an agency committee to focus on safeguards and verification and to ensure that nations comply with international obligations. He also complained that nations such as Iran, which has been under investigation for proliferation, have been allowed to sit on the IAEA board of governors.

The agency refused to comment directly on Mr. Bush's criticism and referred instead to an article by Mr. ElBaradei in the New York Times yesterday.

In the article, Mr. ElBaradei called on the United States and the other declared nuclear powers to relinquish their nuclear weapons as part of a global effort to make it impossible for such weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists.

"If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction," he wrote.

China said yesterday that it has a "common interest" with Washington in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promised to take "effective measures" to enforce recently issued rules against exports of arms technology by Chinese companies.

Beijing is under pressure to stop what U.S. officials say is the transfer of missile and weapons technology by Chinese companies to Iran, Pakistan and other countries. The United States has sanctioned several Chinese companies accused of spreading weapons technology, including a major state-owned conglomerate.

India hailed Mr. Bush's call for tighter curbs and said its own nuclear arsenal should not raise concerns.

"We welcome his emphasis on the imperative of collective action to check proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that the existing nonproliferation order is inadequate," a Foreign Ministry statement said.

Japan said Mr. Bush's call was a step in the "right direction."

Mr. Bush's speech, however, drew criticism in Kuala Lumpur, where Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi denied that his country played any role in the nuclear-trafficking network.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040212-093052-1900r.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

February 17, 2004

Russia Flexes Muscles With Missile Testing

A planned large-scale demonstration of the Kremlin's nuclear capability comes amid a surge of nostalgia for Soviet strength.

By Kim Murphy, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW — Engaged in its biggest nuclear military exercises in years, Russia prepared Monday to test-launch a series of ballistic missiles and deploy its heavy strategic bombing force in the far north in what President Vladimir V. Putin called an attempt to guarantee the world's "strategic security."

The Russian president boarded the Northern Fleet submarine Arkhangelsk and headed for the Barents Sea, where he will oversee the launch of a powerful missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead from deep beneath the northern sea, possibly as early as today.

Military officials said several ground-based ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles and a military satellite also would be test-fired in the coming days as part of an operation clearly designed to remind the world that Russia remains a nuclear superpower.

"We should by no means behave in a way that makes the world fear us," Putin said last week. "The world should see our military power as an element of strategic security."

He said Russia has not held military exercises on such a scale in recent years due to lack of financing and preparedness, but pledged that the nuclear war games would not be the last.

"During Soviet times, the very factor of the Soviet Union, its power — primarily that of its nuclear forces — was a serious stabilizing factor, the one balancing power in the world," Putin said. "We need to maintain this power, and we will do it."

Worried over North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion into Poland and the Baltics, Russia in recent months has adopted an increasingly firm military tone.

This month, Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov even hinted that Russia might be prepared to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe pact, the continent's principal conventional arms control agreement, in response to what Russia sees as the West's failure to consider its concerns over enlargement of the alliance.

Moscow analysts say the military posturing reflects a Kremlin that is ready to adopt a tougher line toward the U.S. and the European Union. Many Russians believe their nation has little to show for the more conciliatory policies of Putin's first four years as president.

With Putin aiming for reelection next month, he no doubt is mindful that a majority of Russians in recent opinion polls say their greatest wish is to see their nation restored to its former status as a superpower. In a statement to his regional campaign managers last week, Putin echoed a similar sentiment, lamenting the demise of the Soviet Union as "a national tragedy on an enormous scale."

"I think that the ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet space gained nothing from this. On the contrary, people have faced a huge number of problems," Putin said. But he added: "We cannot only look back and curse about this issue. We must look forward."

Perhaps reflecting a common view within the country's military establishment, former top Defense Ministry official Leonid Ivashov said Putin's role at the helm of the strategic exercises "is a solid manifestation that Russia is ready to adequately react to the expansion of NATO into areas close to Russian borders, and the aggressive conduct of the U.S. military machine in the world in general."

Ivashov, who is vice president of the Academy for Geopolitical Sciences, said the exercises "are not aimed at threatening anyone, but they are certainly a warning not to be missed by those in the West who adhere only to a policy of sheer military might."

In a meeting with reporters last week, Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, said neither the U.S. nor any other country would be targeted in the exercises. However, he also said the operation was prompted in part by American plans to develop low-yield nuclear weapons.

"They are trying to make nuclear weapons an instrument of solving military tasks, [to] lower the threshold of nuclear weapons use," Baluyevsky said, according to news agency reports. "Shouldn't we react to that, at least on the headquarters level? I'm sure that we should, and we are doing that."

Baluyevsky declined to disclose the flight routes of the strategic bombers but said the Pentagon had been informed. He called the exercises routine, comparable to test missile launches regularly carried out by the U.S.

Russian news reports said the exercises, parts of which got underway in January, would simulate conventional attacks, including terrorist assaults, on Russia from four sides at once, including outer space — a frontier that almost by definition assumes the United States as an adversary.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported that Tu-160 bombers would fly to the northern Atlantic Ocean, while Tu-95MS bombers would fly over the Arctic region.

Alexander Golts, defense analyst for the journal Yezhenedelny, said the exercises involve a larger-than-usual number of strategic missile launches, most likely timed to coincide with the election campaign in which Putin is expected to easily secure a second term.

"Putin firing one strategic missile after another will look much more convincing than Putin taking part in televised campaign debates," he said.

"The Russian ruling elite finds it hard to come to terms with the idea that Russia is no longer equal to the United States in the way the Soviet Union was," he added.

"The only attribute that can support them in this wishful illusion is the strategic nuclear forces."

Times staff writer Sergei L. Loiko contributed to this report.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russmil17feb17,1,6971274.story?coll=la-home-world>

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Washington Post

February 17, 2004

Pg. 13

U.S.: China Is Ally Against Proliferation

Diplomat's Assertions Follow Reports on Ties to Pakistan

By Edward Cody, Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIJING, Feb. 16 -- A senior U.S. arms control official said Monday that, despite past sales of nuclear-related technology, the Chinese government now seems committed to cooperating with the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea and elsewhere.

The upbeat assessment from John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, seemed designed to take the edge off reports from Washington this weekend quoting U.S. officials saying China has been -- and may still be -- cooperating with Pakistan on nuclear technology and missile development.

"We are engaged in a continuous dialogue with China about what I think is a commitment at the top levels of the Chinese government to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction," Bolton said at a news conference here after the first of two days of talks with Chinese officials.

Bolton's comments appeared intended to draw a distinction between the senior leadership of President Hu Jintao's government and previous Chinese administrations or lower-ranking officials who, the United States says, passed nuclear technology to Pakistan and sold other weapons-related material. On several recent occasions, the Bush administration has imposed sanctions on Chinese firms accused of engaging in such sales.

In the same spirit, Bolton declined to say whether the U.S. government believes China is still helping Pakistan with its nuclear weapons and missile programs or whether he discussed the issues in a meeting Monday with his arms control counterpart at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui.

The Washington Post reported Sunday that documents turned over to the International Atomic Energy Agency by Libya, and believed to have come from Pakistan, contained 1960s-era Chinese nuclear weapons designs. The discovery seemed to confirm the long-standing U.S. charges of Chinese help for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, at least in the past.

China has never acknowledged providing any such help. The Foreign Ministry, asked Monday about the documents turned over by Libya, did not immediately respond. The government published a white paper last December that, while omitting any reference to past policies, said that China did not "support, encourage or assist any country to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."

At the same time, the Chinese government has resisted embracing the Proliferation Security Initiative created by President Bush last May. The initiative was designed to commit governments to tightening intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation to prevent trafficking in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction equipment or technology. Bolton said that in his talks, Chinese officials agreed with the initiative's goals but did not agree to take part.

China and the United States have nonetheless been cooperating closely in an effort to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Largely through Chinese diplomacy, the North Korean government has agreed to a new round of talks on the issue in Beijing beginning Feb. 25.

Bolton also met Monday with Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China's point man on the North Korean nuclear confrontation, and planned a session Tuesday with Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. He reported after his talks with Wang that Beijing and Washington shared the goal of a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

"I don't think the Chinese government has deviated from that objective," he said.

Bolton acknowledged, however, that the six nations involved in the talks -- North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia -- have different ideas about the best way to reach that goal. Recent Chinese statements have suggested the Bush administration should show more flexibility and display readiness during the upcoming talks to match any concessions North Korea is willing to make.

But Bolton strongly indicated that the Bush administration, as it has in the past, will insist on focusing the talks on forcing North Korea to dismantle its nuclear development before discussing its demands for economic aid and security guarantees.

"I think our position is going to be largely what it was before -- that is, complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program," he said.

This must include acknowledging and dismantling whatever work has been done on producing highly enriched uranium as well as plutonium, Bolton said.

North Korea has proposed freezing work at its Yongbyon facility, which produces weapons-grade plutonium. Work at the facility was stopped under a deal with the Clinton administration but restarted last year. U.S. officials have insisted the North Korean government must also acknowledge and halt a separate program that they say makes highly enriched uranium, another ingredient for nuclear weapons.

"The only way to get a complete dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program is to get rid of the uranium-route and the plutonium-route parts of the program," Bolton said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46375-2004Feb16.html>

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Washington Post

February 15, 2004

Pg. 1

Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back To China

Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans

By Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, Washington Post Staff Writers

Investigators have discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China, exposing yet another link in a chain of proliferation that stretched across the Middle East and Asia, according to government officials and arms experts.

The bomb designs and other papers turned over by Libya have yielded dramatic evidence of China's long-suspected role in transferring nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the early 1980s, they said. The Chinese designs were later resold to Libya by a Pakistani-led trading network that is now the focus of an expanding international probe, added the officials and experts, who are based in the United States and Europe.

The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said.

"It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered."

U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon -- assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said.

China's actions "were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else China provided to Pakistan's nuclear program," said David Albright, a nuclear physicist and former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq. "These documents also raise questions about whether Iran, North Korea and perhaps others received these documents from Pakistanis or their agents."

The package of documents was turned over to U.S. officials in November following Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction and open his country's weapons laboratories to international inspection. The blueprints, which were flown to Washington last month, have been analyzed by experts from the United States, Britain and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

Weapons experts in Libya also found large amounts of equipment used in making enriched uranium, the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. That discovery helped expose a rogue nuclear trading network that officials say funneled technology and parts to Libya as well as Iran and North Korea. A central figure in the network, Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged in a televised confession last month that he had passed nuclear secrets to others. Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then pardoned Khan.

Of the many proliferation activities linked to Khan's network, the selling of weapon designs is viewed as the most serious. The documents found in Libya contained most of the information needed to assemble a bomb, assuming the builder could acquire the plutonium or highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear explosion, according to U.S. and European weapons experts familiar with the blueprints. At the same time, one of the chief difficulties for countries trying to build nuclear weapons has been obtaining the plutonium or uranium.

Libya appeared to have made minimal progress toward building a weapon, and had no missile in its arsenal capable of carrying the 1,000-pound nuclear device depicted in the drawings, the officials said. However, weapons experts noted, the blueprints would have been far more valuable to the other known customers of Khan's network.

"This design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North Korea," said Albright, whose Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security has studied the nonconventional weapons programs of both states. The design "appears deliverable by North Korea's Nodong missile, Iran's Shahab-3 missile and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War," he said.

Such a relatively simple design also might be coveted by terrorist groups who seek nuclear weapons but lack the technical sophistication or infrastructure to build a modern weapon, said one Europe-based weapons expert familiar with the blueprints. While such a bomb would be difficult to deliver by air, "you could drive it away in a pickup truck," the expert said.

The device depicted in the blueprints appears similar to a weapon known to have been tested by China in the 1960s, officials familiar with the documents said. Although of an older design, the bomb is an implosion device that is smaller and more sophisticated than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Implosion bombs use precision-timed conventional explosives to squeeze a sphere of fissile material and trigger a nuclear chain reaction.

Pakistan's first nuclear test in 1998 involved a more modern design than the one sold to Libya. Albright said the Libyan documents "do not appear to contain any information about the nuclear weapons Pakistan has built."

The documents at the center of the investigation were handed over to IAEA inspectors in two white plastic shopping bags from a Pakistani clothing shop. The shop's name -- Good Looks Tailor -- and Islamabad address were printed

on the bags in red letters. One of the bags contained drawings and blueprints of different sizes; the other contained a stack of instructions on how to build not only a bomb but also its essential components.

The documents themselves seemed a hodgepodge -- some in good condition, others smudged and dirty; some professionally printed, others handwritten. Many of the papers were "copies of copies of copies," said one person familiar with them. The primary documents were entirely in English, while a few ancillary papers contained Chinese text. The package also included open-literature articles on nuclear weapons from U.S. weapons laboratories, officials familiar with the documents said.

Strikingly, although most of the essential design elements were included, a few key parts were missing, the officials and experts said. Some investigators have speculated that the missing papers could have been lost, or hadn't yet been provided -- possibly they were being withheld pending additional payments. Others suggested that the drawings were simply thrown in as a bonus with the purchase of uranium-enrichment equipment -- "the cherry on the sundae," one knowledgeable official said.

Libyan scientists interviewed by international inspectors about the designs said they had not seriously studied them and were unaware that anything was missing. As Libya had no suitable missile or delivery system for a nuclear weapon, the scientists might have decided to delay work on bomb designs until other parts of their weapons program were further advanced, one knowledgeable U.S. official said.

U.S. and European investigators said there were many similarities among the other nuclear-related designs and components found in Libya and Iran, suggesting they were provided by the same network.

As for who delivered the material to the Libyans, a European official who has studied the question said the connection to the Khan network was indirect. "The middleman is quite invisible. The middleman has covered his tracks very well."

The evidence of China's transfer of nuclear plans to Pakistan confirms something that U.S. officials have believed since at least the early 1980s. A declassified State Department report on Pakistan's nuclear program written in 1983 concluded that China had "provided assistance" to Pakistan's bomb-making program. "We now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly nuclear device design," the report said.

While the discovery of direct evidence of such cooperation was disturbing, it was noteworthy that China's views on proliferation have changed dramatically since the 1980s, and its leaders now generally cooperate with the United States and other countries in stopping the leaking of sensitive weapons technology, said Jonathan Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"Did the Chinese make a huge mistake in sharing technology with Pakistan? Sure. Did we make a mistake by looking the other way in the 1980s when Pakistan was developing the bomb? Yes," Wolfsthal said. "But none of that should get in the way of dealing with the real threats we face today. Our priority must be to drain the swamp created by the action of these nuclear suppliers and businessmen over the past 10 years."

Researcher Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42692-2004Feb14.html>

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Washington Times

February 15, 2004

Pg. 2

Bush Accents Peril Of WMDs Spread

By Associated Press

President Bush emphasized yesterday the need to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, stressing the dangers of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons getting into the hands of terrorists.

"The possibility of secret and sudden attack with weapons of mass destruction is the greatest threat before humanity today," Mr. Bush said in his weekly radio address.

The president said the United States is developing and deploying missile defenses to protect people against the possibility of attack from ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Every means of diplomacy is used to deal with regimes that are thought to be developing deadly weapons, said Mr. Bush, adding that the United States is cooperating with more than a dozen nations under the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials transported by land, sea or air.

Still, the United States has shown its willingness to use force when necessary, he said. "No one can now doubt the determination of America to oppose and to end these threats to our security," he noted.

Mr. Bush said the United States is also combating black-market operatives who sell equipment and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction. He cited U.S. intelligence agencies' work in exposing the underground Pakistani network that supplied nuclear-weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the

Pakistani nuclear scientist who was the father of the country's nuclear-weapons program, admitted being the mastermind of the scheme.

The scientist was pardoned by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

Mr. Bush talked up proposed new steps to halt illicit weapons trafficking. His seven-point plan to combat the spread of such weapons — detailed earlier in the week — included expanding a U.S.-led international effort to halt commerce in weapons moving by land, sea or air, and tightening laws and international controls on weapons proliferation.

"We must expand the international cooperation of law enforcement organizations to act against proliferation networks, to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets and to bring their members to justice," he said.

Mr. Bush also urged the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.

"Terrorists and terrorist states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must lose," he said. "They are resourceful; we must be more resourceful. They are determined; we must be more determined."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040215-123359-3044r.htm>

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Washington Post

February 16, 2004

Pg. 19

Iran Announces Plans To Sell Nuclear Fuel

By Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press

TEHRAN, Feb. 15 -- Iran said Sunday that it plans to sell nuclear reactor fuel internationally, establishing the Islamic republic as a country with the technology required to enrich uranium.

Announcing the decision, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said Iran had made an "important achievement" in acquiring the means to enrich uranium, and insisted the project would be for peaceful use.

Once Iran produces nuclear fuel, it will market it under the strict supervision of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he said.

"This is an industry which can both be used by our plants and supplied to the international markets," Kharrazi was quoted as saying by the official Islamic Republic News Agency. "No one can deprive us of this natural, legal and legitimate right. This industry is strictly for peaceful use."

He added that Iran had suspended uranium enrichment, "but this does not mean that we will give up this industry, which is our national pride."

The United States seeks to restrict countries from acquiring uranium enrichment technology, and Iran's sale of fuel would prove it already possesses the capability.

Washington has said it suspects Iran of conducting a secret program to build nuclear weapons, but Tehran says its program is geared only toward energy production.

On Sunday, Kharrazi accused the United States of trying to influence the IAEA board before it meets in March to hear a report on Iran's compliance record. "Americans want to influence the upcoming IAEA meeting, but we are ready to cooperate transparently and answer all questions. IAEA supervision is carried out carefully and we have nothing to worry about," he said.

U.S. officials have said that if the meeting finds Iran is not in compliance, they could urge the IAEA board to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions or other options.

To dispel suspicions Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, Iran signed an additional protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty late last year allowing unfettered inspections of its nuclear sites. It also suspended its uranium enrichment program -- insisting it was a voluntary, temporary goodwill gesture.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44388-2004Feb15.html>

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